Este artigo investiga as posições do liberalismo político de John Rawls e do republicanismo de Hannah Arendt em relação ao humanismo cívico e ao republicanismo clássico. Defende que o republicanismo de Arendt não deve ser considerado um humanismo cívico abrangente e que há uma proximidade entre o liberalismo político e o republicanismo clássico, pois sustenta que um perfeccionismo minimalista baseado em virtudes políticas informa as duas teorias.

In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that (...) there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. (shrink)

Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' (...) sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways. (shrink)

Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...) capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance. (shrink)

Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...) evidenceresponsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs. Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This view makes room for holding both that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions. (shrink)

The orthodox view in epistemology is that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive. I offer a novel argument for a version of this view, one that appeals to capacities to rationally respond to evidence. I do so by developing the Sellarsian idea that the concept of belief functions to mark the space of reasons in a non-intellectualist and naturalistic direction. The resulting view does justice to the role of belief in social interactions, joint deliberation, and rational persuasion, while including evidence-resistant beliefs and (...) animal beliefs as genuine beliefs. It has a range of further benefits: it helps us account for epistemic normativity, paves the way for better psychological models of belief revision, distinguishes beliefs from imaginings and mere acceptances, and helps us avoid noxious simplistic takes on human irrationality. (shrink)

Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appeal to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It (...) then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. (shrink)

Starting from the notions of q-entailment and p-entailment, a two-dimensional notion of entailment is developed with respect to certain generalized q-matrices referred to as B-matrices. After showing that every purely monotonic singleconclusion consequence relation is characterized by a class of B-matrices with respect to q-entailment as well as with respect to p-entailment, it is observed that, as a result, every such consequence relation has an inferentially four-valued characterization. Next, the canonical form of B-entailment, a two-dimensional multiple-conclusion notion of entailment based (...) on B-matrices, is introduced, providing a uniform framework for studying several different notions of entailment based on designation, antidesignation, and their complements. Moreover, the two-dimensional concept of a B-consequence relation is defined, and an abstract characterization of such relations by classes of B-matrices is obtained. Finally, a contribution to the study of inferential many-valuedness is made by generalizing Suszko’s Thesis and the corresponding reduction to show that any B-consequence relation is, in general, inferentially four-valued. (shrink)

Delusions are standardly defined as attitudes that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. But what evidence do people with delusion have for and against it? Do delusions really go against their total evidence? How are the answers affected by different conceptions of evidence? -/- This chapter focuses on how delusions relate to evidence. I consider what delusions-relevant evidence people with delusions have. I give some reasons to think that people typically have evidence for their delusions, and (...) that the evidence they have against them is often overstated. I draw on this discussion to consider whether delusions are evidentially supported and epistemically rational. Finally, I discuss implications for the nature of delusion, responsibility, and treatment and suggest directions for future research. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to different conceptions of evidence and rationality in epistemology. -/- A central upshot is that what we should say about the epistemic standing of delusions depends substantively on our positions in epistemology, in particular, on the debate between internalists and externalists about evidence. If we want clarity on the epistemic standing of delusions, we need to incorporate more sophisticated tools from epistemology. (shrink)

Commentary on Pablo Hubacher Haerle’s paper “Is OCD Epistemically Irrational?”. I argue for expanding our assessment of rationality in OCD by considering a wider range of epistemic parameters and how they fit together.

Little has been studied on the relationship between affect and school problems related with attendance. This study aims to identify different affective profiles and to determine whether these profiles differ from each other based on the four functional conditions of school refusal behavior. Participants comprised 1,816 Spanish adolescents aged 15–18 years. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule for Children-Short Form and the School Refusal Assessment Scale-Revised for Children were administered. Latent profile analysis revealed five affective profiles: low affective profile, self-fulfilling (...) profile, low positive affect profile, self-destructive profile, and high affective profile. The self-destructive profile revealed the highest average scores in the first three factors of the SRAS-R-C, whereas the high affective profile reached the highest average score in the fourth factor. On the contrary, the self-fulfilling profile obtained the lowest average scores in the first two factors of the SRAS-R-C, whereas the low affective profile revealed the lowest average scores in the last two factors. Findings suggest the relevance of developing more adaptative affective profiles, such as the self-fulfilling profile, which would contribute to diminishing school attendance problems. (shrink)

The article went deeper into Richard Rorty’s texts that address the self as “a set of beliefs and desires.” In an imbrication of philosophy with psychoanalysis, Rorty’s hermeneutics accompanies the critique of psychoanalysis regarding the self-centralization from Metaphysical tradition, one of the strategies of self-redescription. The other strategy is aesthetic redescription. This redescription is based on understanding the psychic world as an encounter of “beliefs and desires” as “quasi-people.” The thread of our argument is the articulation of psychoanalysis with the (...) concept of “hegemony.” This reflexive line occurs due to the agonist and conflicting context of internal alterity from the “interpersonal” relationship between conscious and unconscious, rediscovering the self. (shrink)

A importância da memória na Subida do Monte Carmelo advém de sua capacidade de manter as experiências agradáveis ou desagradáveis, permitindolhes que se aprofundem e se ramifiquem na alma, com graves repercussões na vida espiritual. A memória busca, no arquivo de imagens e vivências, dados que alimentem a agressividade, a cobiça, a paixão, soberba e vingança; com o agravante de que não tem limites de duração, o que lhe permite realizar continuamente esta sua ação. A alma, quando retém e apreende (...) preferencialmente a lembrança de amarguras passadas, acaba não se abrindo para a ação divina que ora se lhe manifesta. Por isso, para que participe diretamente da comunhão divina,da mesma forma que as demais potências espirituais, a memória deve esvaziarse. A purificação e o esvaziamento da memória não prescrevem o esquecimento do que se conhece ou se lembra, apenas manifestam a necessidade de ela ficar livre de considerações particulares numa esperança que a purifica a fim de deixá-la livre para receber a comunicação divina. (shrink)

Some classical studies in social psychology suggest that we are more sensitive to situational factors, and less responsive to reasons, than we normally recognize we are. In recent years, moral responsibility theorists have examined the question whether those studies represent a serious threat to our moral responsibility. A common response to the “situationist threat” has been to defend the reasons-responsiveness of ordinary human agents by appeal to a theory of reasons-responsiveness that appeals to patterns of counterfactual scenarios or possible worlds. (...) In this paper I identify a problem with that response and I offer a better solution. (shrink)

In this article I examine the relation between causation and moral responsibility. I distinguish four possible views about that relation. One is the standard view: the view that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome requires, and is grounded in, the agent's causal responsibility for it. I discuss several challenges to the standard view, which motivate the three remaining views. The final view – the view I argue for – is that causation is the vehicle of transmission of moral responsibility. (...) According to this view, although moral responsibility does not require causation, causation still grounds moral responsibility. (shrink)

There is an initial presumption against disjunctive causes. First of all, for some people causation is a relation between events. But, arguably, there are no disjunctive events, since events are particulars and thus they have spatiotemporal locations, while it is unclear what the spatiotemporal location of a disjunctive event could be.1 More importantly, even if one believes that entities like facts can enter in causal relations, and even if there are disjunctive facts, it is still hard to see how disjunctive (...) facts could be causes. Imagine, for instance, the following scenario. I have a gun filled with red paint and another gun filled with blue paint, and I fire both guns at my neighbor’s white wall. A moment later, there is a graffiti on the wall and my neighbor notifies the police. He would have done so regardless of the graffiti’s color, since all he cares about is the existence of a graffiti on his wall. Is it plausible to claim that a disjunctive fact is a cause of his notifying the police? In particular, is it plausible to claim that he notified the police because I fired the red-paint gun or the blue-paint gun (the thought being that my firing paint of either color would have sufficed)? It seems not. The police was notified because of the actual graffiti on the wall, and the actual graffiti on the wall is made of a certain pattern of colored patches. Imagine, that, as it turns out, there are patches of both colors on the wall. Then it seems that both my firing the red-paint gun and my firing the blue-paint gun were causes of my neighbor’s notifying the police. In other words, my firing the red-paint gun and my firing the blue-paint gun jointly caused the outcome: each of them was a contributory cause of the outcome’s occurrence. On the other hand, imagine that there are only patches of one color on the wall. Then it seems that my firing only one of the guns was a cause. Either way, the disjunction fails to be a cause: either my firing the red-paint gun was a cause, or my firing the blue-paint gun was a cause, or they were both causes, but their disjunction was not.. (shrink)

A modo de preámbulo, consideramos importante mencionar que el presente ensayo pretende entrelazar los conceptos mirada y seducción desde distintas ópticas. Se plantean someramente algunas ideas desde la filosofía hasta el psicoanálisis. Se inicia con una “mirada” a las construcciones literarias de creadores de gran importancia, tales como Jean Braudrillard y Georges Bataille, en quienes se estudia la idea del ojo perverso, de la mirada y el deseo, subjetividad que nos atrapa. Se ambiciona articular con teorizaciones psicoanalíticas de lo inconsciente, (...) abundando en investigaciones freudianas y de otros teóricos del psicoanálisis para analizar e interpretar sus “seductoras” aportaciones.By way of preamble, we consider important to mention that this essay intends to link the concepts of look and seduction from different angles. Some ideas are raised from philosophy to psychoanalysis. The article starts with a “look” to the creators of literary constructions of great importance such as Jean Braudrillard and Georges Bataille, in order to study the idea of the evil eye, the gaze and desire, the subjectivity that catch us. The article aspires to articulate psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious, abounding in Freudian investigations and other theorists of psychoanalysis to analyze and interpret “seductive” contributions. (shrink)

The standard notion of formal theory, in logic, is in general biased exclusively towards assertion: it commonly refers only to collections of assertions that any agent who accepts the generating axioms of the theory should also be committed to accept. In reviewing the main abstract approaches to the study of logical consequence, we point out why this notion of theory is unsatisfactory at multiple levels, and introduce a novel notion of theory that attacks the shortcomings of the received notion by (...) allowing one to take both assertions and denials on a par. This novel notion of theory is based on a bilateralist approach to consequence operators, which we hereby introduce, and whose main properties we investigate in the present paper. (shrink)

Does a person's liability to attack during a war depend on the nature of their individual causal contribution to the (unjust) threat posed? If so, how? The recent literature on the ethics of war has become increasingly focused on questions of this kind. According to some views on these matters, your liability hinges on the extent of your causal contribution: the larger your contribution to an unjust threat, the larger the amount of harm that we can impose on you in (...) order to avert the threat. Some philosophers have suggested that we can ground a quite general principle of civilian immunity on this basis. But, do causal contributions really come in degrees? Can we make sense of a graded notion of causal contribution that can be relevant to debates about liability in war? I argue there is good reason to be sceptical. The appearance that causal contributions come in degrees is just an illusion that can be explained away. (shrink)

Over the years, two models of freedom have emerged as competitors: the alternative-possibilities model and the actual-sequence model. This paper is a partial defense of the actual-sequence model. My defense relies on two strategies. The first strategy consists in de-emphasizing the role of examples in arguing for a model of freedom. Imagine that, as some people think, Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine the alternative-possibilities model. What follows from this? Not much, I argue. In particular, I note that the counterparts of (...) Frankfurt-style cases also fail to undermine the actual-sequence model. My second strategy of defense consists in revitalizing the original motivation for the actual-sequence model, by revamping it, isolating it from claims that do not fully capture the same idea, and arguing that it can be developed in a successful way. (shrink)

Opinion leaders within the community may lead debate on animal welfare issues and provide a path for information to their social networks. However, little is known about OLs’ attitudes, activities conducted to express their views about animal welfare and whether they are well informed, or not, about husbandry practices in the red meat industry. This study aimed to identify OLs in the general public and among producers and compare OLs and non-OLs’ attitudes, knowledge and actions to express their views about (...) the red meat industry. Two questionnaires, one for the Australian general public and one for Australian red meat producers, were developed to identify general attitudes. From these questionnaires, OLs were identified using a two-step cluster analysis. Subsequently, a sub-sample of 19 OLs participated in a follow-up phone interview. Results disclosed some clear OLs’ characteristics. Public OLs held more negative perceptions of the red meat industry and perceived they had more knowledge about husbandry procedures. However, their actual knowledge about animal husbandry was not different from non-OLs. Public OLs also used and trusted social and internet media more than did non-OLs. In the producer group, a large percentage of OLs were identified. Producer OLs had more actual knowledge about animal husbandry and engaged in more behaviours to express dissatisfaction with the industry than non-OLs. Unlike the public respondents, this group used conventional media more than social and internet media, and their levels of trust in all kinds of media were low. While there were clear differences, both groups believed that is important to increase communication and educate about farm practices. This may present an opportunity to develop an opinion leader intervention strategy where informed OLs could later disseminate accurate information to their social networks. Further studies should test if sustained and facilitated educational sessions between public and producer OLs can assist in increasing communication, knowledge and perhaps, may assist in achieving convergence of concerns and expectations between both groups. (shrink)

O artigo compara duas propostas de educação da areté nos textos de Platão: o “mito de Prometeu” no Protágoras e o “mito da caverna” no Livro VII de A República. Isso se deve à ambiguidade do termo areté, que pode ser virtude moral ou competência. Esse debate se traduziu, acompanhando a terminologia de Francis Wolff, numa abordagem complementar da “verdade jurídica” defendida pelo personagem de Protágoras em contexto democrático, com a “competência técnica” do personagem Sócrates, na segunda perspectiva. Debate que (...) acarreta, até hoje, respectivos desdobramentos pedagógicos. Palavras-chave : Platão. Areté. Democracia. Competência. Educação. (shrink)

Gianni Vattimo associates “mystic” and metaphysics. The “forgetting of the being” would be coextensive to the abandonment (Gelassenheit) or to the mystic “losing oneself” (Versenkung) in the absolute. Based on this, the article analyzes the relevance and the possibility of the vattimiana hermeneutics referring to (Verwindung) “the mystic” to surpass it. The perspective of the hermeneutic ethics of Vattimo defends that the history of modernity, in its nihilism and secularization, keeps traces of the history of the salvation inaugurated by the (...) Jewish-Christian perspective. The “mystical losing oneself” contradicts the Pauline experience of the preparation of parusía. Based on Heidegger, the Italian philosopher defends that, considering the imminent parusía, the authenticity of the temporal experience to the Pauline Christian, meant going through, with faith, the present tribulation in the caducity of the historical contingency, hindering the mystical Versenkung and its respective evasion in the daily efforts. In favor of this persistence/effort, it is glimpsed cáritas, inaugurated by the kénosis in the East, as the optimum authenticity criterion for a contemporary spirituality; because cáritas would imply, in its opposition to the implicit violence of the absolute fundamentals, the recognition of the bond between the spiritual and the nihilist and secularized East. (shrink)

O artigo preconiza a relevância pedagógica da filosofia da não-significação de Albert Camus, especialmente em O Mito de Sísifo. O eixo argumentativo segue a última frase deste livro: “É preciso imaginar Sísifo feliz”. A certeza da existência e a estranheza de se inserir num cenário de catástrofe, sem esperança, suscita em estudantes, especialmente da rede pública, um “sentimento da absurdidade”, mas esse estado não há de ser visto como maldição. A liberdade paradoxalmente advém quando se assume o absurdo como meio (...) de se afirmar a vida, contra os suicídios físico e filosófico, tornando Sísifo o “herói absurdo”. Camus atribui ao pensamento de Søren Kierkegaard a proposta do suicídio filosófico como sacrifício do intelecto pelo salto kiekegaardiano da fé porque ele entende a felicidade encontrada na vida eterna como uma superação e cura da doença mortal do desespero. O esforço dialético de autorreflexão da consciência entre o finito e o infinito faz da resignação infinita uma preparação para o salto da fé. Para nosso autor, porém, o pior mal é não ter sofrido desespero, pois é a partir dele que imaginativamente o absurdo, como potência existencial, transfigura-se numa “revolta metafísica” — uma posição a ser desenvolvida no processo de ensino-aprendizagem em Filosofia. Palavras-chave: Albert Camus. Absurdo. Imaginação. Ensino de Filosofia. (shrink)